Pacto nuclear con Irán (2015)

El pacto nuclear con Irán de 2015, denominado Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto (PAIC; en inglés: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), fue un acuerdo internacional sobre el programa nuclear iraní, establecido en Viena el 14 de julio de 2015 entre Irán, los P5+1 (los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas —China, Francia, Rusia, Reino Unido, Estados Unidos— más Alemania y la Unión Europea.

Según el acuerdo, Irán acordó eliminar sus reservas de uranio enriquecido medio, disminuir sus reservas de uranio enriquecido bajo un 98% y reducir en dos tercios sus centrifugadoras de gas durante trece años. A lo largo de los quince años siguientes, Irán solo enriquecería uranio hasta un 3,67%. Irán también acordó no construir ningún reactor nuclear nuevo de agua pesada durante el mismo período de tiempo. El enriquecimiento de uranio se limitaría a una sola instalación que utilizase centrifugadoras de primera generación durante diez años. Otras instalaciones serían transformadas para evitar los riesgos de la proliferación nuclear.

Para vigilar y verificar el cumplimiento del acuerdo por parte de Irán, el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (OEIA) tendría acceso regular a todas las instalaciones nucleares iraníes. El acuerdo establecía que, en compensación por sus compromisos, Irán sería aliviado de las sanciones económicas que le habían impuesto los Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

En mayo de 2018, el presidente de los Estados Unidos Donald Trump anunció la retirada de su país del acuerdo, y el restablecimiento de las sanciones a Irán.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Vienna, 14 July 2015

PREFACE

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and theUnited States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs andSecurity Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint ComprehensivePlan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusivelypeaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate thatfull implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and internationalpeace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, developor acquire any nuclear weapons.

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful,indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, inaccordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraginginternational cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitationsdescribed in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, ofIran’s peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercialprogramme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow themto gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme. The JCPOAreflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreedlimits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D.The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3’s concerns, including through comprehensive measuresproviding for transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions aswell as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, includingsteps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

  • i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, theRussian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the HighRepresentative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocalcommitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to beendorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
  • ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful natureof Iran’s nuclear programme.
  • iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop oracquire any nuclear weapons.
  • iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right tonuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and theIranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of anyother non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.
  • v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Councilsanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclearprogramme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance andenergy.
  • vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principlesof the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.
  • vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of thenuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit ofnuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
  • viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in aconstructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from anyaction inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that wouldundermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain fromimposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu ofthe sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Genevaon 24 November 2013.
  • ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established tomonitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functionsprovided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arisingfrom the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with theprovisions as detailed in the relevant annex.
  • x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitorand verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. TheIAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, andas provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules andregulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fullyobserved by all parties involved.
  • xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose ofits implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered assetting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles ofinternational law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and otherrelevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles andpractices.
  • xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in theannexes to this document.
  • xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, willcooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy andengage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed inAnnex III, including through IAEA involvement.
  • xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing thisJCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in itsconsideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationshipwith Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for thetermination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previousresolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion ofconsideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years afterthe Adoption Day.
  • xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respectivedurations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
  • xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlierif needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriatedecisions by consensus.

Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe asdetailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes

NUCLEAR

A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES

  • 1. Iran’s long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichmentand uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specificresearch and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed bygradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activitiesfor exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I. Iran will abide by itsvoluntary commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment andenrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for theAdditional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
  • 2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iranwill keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uraniumenrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring,as specified in Annex I.
  • 3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulateenriched uranium. Iran’s enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will onlyinclude IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will notengage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium asspecified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and willcommence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years,as detailed in Annex I.
  • 4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assembleother centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failedcentrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advancedcentrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end ofthe eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreednumbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all ofthe manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until theyare needed under Iran’s long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
  • 5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uraniumenrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the NatanzEnrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, atFordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D andfrom keeping any nuclear material.
  • 6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre.International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships willbe established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades willremain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium andwill be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, forstable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructurewill remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will beremoved and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
  • 7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet internationalqualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uraniumstockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or theequivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based oninternational prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for naturaluranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level.Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for usein Iran’s nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF6stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. TheJoint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technicalcooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards fornuclear fuel produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5%and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Anyadditional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at internationalmarket prices.

B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING

  • 8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak,based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form ofan international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor willsupport peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical andindustrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities forredesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor willbe carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for thelifetime of the reactor. This international partnership will include participatingE3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined.Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and theE3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official documentwhich would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
  • 9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement inrelying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhancedinternational cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.
  • 10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water inIran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to theinternational market.
  • 11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and researchnuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevantcontracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
  • 12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spentfuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, orreprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with thesole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production ofmedical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.

C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

  • 13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iranwill provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed withits ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement themodified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
  • 14. Iran will fully implement the «Roadmap for Clarification of Past and PresentOutstanding Issues» agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address pastand present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as raised in theannex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 thefinal assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to theBoard of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board ofGovernors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for taking necessaryaction, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of theBoard of Governors.
  • 15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measuresfor their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as setout in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEApresence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iranfrom all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillanceof centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certifiedmodern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronicseals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concernsfor 15 years, as defined in Annex I.
  • 16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute tothe development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutoniummetallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
  • 17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in thisJCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

SANCTIONS

  • 18. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate allprovisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iraniannuclear issue – 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) – simultaneously with the IAEA-verifiedimplementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establishspecific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.(1)
  • 19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequentlyamended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions,including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verifiedimplementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified inAnnex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the followingareas, as described in Annex II:
    • i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financialinstitutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
    • ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondentbanking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiariesof Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;
    • iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
    • iv. Supply of specialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, forpersons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including theCentral Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
    • v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees orinsurance);
    • vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans tothe Government of Iran;
    • vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;
    • viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas andpetrochemical products;
    • ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemicalsectors;
    • x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
    • xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology;
    • xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
    • xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;
    • xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
    • xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
    • xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
    • xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminumand steel, and export or software for integrating industrialprocesses;
    • xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visaban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
    • xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.
  • 20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EUproliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years afterAdoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclearmaterial in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.
  • 21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, inaccordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effectsimultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover thefollowing areas as described in Annex II:
    • i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financialinstitutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran andspecified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by theOffice of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals andBlocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II(including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payablethrough-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreignexchange transactions and letters of credit);
    • ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;
    • iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
    • iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitationson their transfer;
    • v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;
    • vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranianfinancial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
    • vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
    • viii. Efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales;
    • ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services,information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran’s oil,gas and petrochemical sectors;
    • x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum,petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
    • xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemicalproducts to Iran;
    • xii. Transactions with Iran’s energy sector;
    • xiii. Transactions with Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors and portoperators;
    • xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;
    • xv. Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum andsteel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
    • xvi. Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran’sautomotive sector;
    • xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
    • xviii. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from theSDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN IranSanctions Act List; and
    • xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections5 – 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.
  • 22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V,allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and servicesto Iran; license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person toengage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license theimportation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.
  • 23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the BroaderConclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may beappropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctionsspecified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities andservices for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent withthe U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.
  • 24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list ofall nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them inaccordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting ofsanctions beginning on «Implementation Day». If at any time following theImplementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction orrestrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of thesanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in questionwill consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur thatlifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOAparticipant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able toresolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to theJoint Commission.
  • 25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing theimplementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the UnitedStates will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities,with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will activelyencourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes inthe U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and torefrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.
  • 26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it hasterminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the disputeresolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctionsor restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith tosustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the fullbenefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S.Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President andthe Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctionsspecified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, withoutprejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. TheU.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the Presidentand the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iranhas stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, asgrounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or inpart.
  • 27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures toensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under thisJCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issuerelevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details ofsanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. TheEU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iranregarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis andwhenever appropriate.
  • 28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in aconstructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any actioninconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermineits successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 andIran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOAincluding in their public statements (2). The E3/EU+3 will take all measuresrequired to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional ordiscriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctionsand restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.
  • 29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with theirrespective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly andadversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iraninconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successfulimplementation of this JCPOA.
  • 30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons orentities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for inthis JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOAas specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of suchsanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.
  • 31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States willterminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entitiesand individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks andfinancial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will removedesignation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially DesignatedNationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on theForeign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachmentsthereto.
  • 32. EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projectswith Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field ofpeaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuelfabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety andsecurity, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will takenecessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.
  • 33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas oftrade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areasfor cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this contextconsider the use of available instruments such as export credits to facilitatetrade, project financing and investment in Iran.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

  • 34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to thesequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:
    • i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concludedamong the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of theresolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption withoutdelay.
    • ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UNSecurity Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consentof the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in thisJCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will makenecessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of theirJCPOA commitments.
    • iii. Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA reportverifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described inSections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actionsdescribed in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance withthe UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of AnnexV occur at the UN level.
    • iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which theDirector General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reachedthe Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peacefulactivities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States willtake the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively andIran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President andParliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
    • v. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UNSecurity Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to itsterms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisionsof previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will takethe actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
  • 35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudiceto the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

  • 36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting theircommitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commissionfor resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meetingits commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. TheJoint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time periodwas extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, anyparticipant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed thecompliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolvethe issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After JointCommission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at theMinisterial level – either the complaining participant or the participant whoseperformance is in question could request that the issue be considered by anAdvisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed bythe participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The AdvisoryBoard should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commissionwould consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days inorder to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfactionof the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issueto constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat theunresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under thisJCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believesthe issue constitutes significant non-performance.
  • 37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as describedabove, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made toexhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN SecurityCouncil, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue thesanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Councilresolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise.In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contractssigned between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to thedate of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution ofsuch contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UNSecurity Council resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notificationis resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the Statesinvolved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran hasstated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that asgrounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

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(1) The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.(2) ‘Government officials’ for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.

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Presentación del pacto nuclear con Irán, en Viena, el 14 de julio de 2015. De izquierda a derecha, los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores o secretarios de Estado Wang Yi (China), Laurent Fabius (Francia), Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Alemania), Federica Mogherini (UE), Mohammad Javad Zarif (Irán), Philip Hammond (Reino Unido) y John Kerry (EE UU). Foto: Dragan Tatic, Ministerio Federal de Asuntos Europeos e Internacionales – Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Austria (Flickr, Wikimedia Commons)

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