Acuerdo Sykes-Picot (1916)

Acuerdo Sykes-Picot
El plan para el reparto de Oriente Próximo entre británicos y franceses tras la derrota del Imperio Otomano, según el acuerdo Sykes-Picot

El acuerdo Sykes-Picot fue un pacto secreto entre Gran Bretaña y Francia, con el consentimiento de la Rusia aún presoviética, para el reparto de las posesiones del Imperio Otomano en Oriente Próximo tras la Primera Guerra Mundial. Ratificado en mayo de 1916, el acuerdo estipulaba que —pese a las promesas realizadas a los árabes a cambio de su levantamiento contra los turcos— Siria, Irak, Líbano y Palestina se dividirían en áreas administradas por británicos y franceses.

Finalmente, en la Conferencia de Paz de París (1919) se optó por un reparto de territorios entre británicos y franceses bajo la forma de mandatos de la Sociedad de Naciones.

Mark Sykes y François Georges-Picot
Mark Sykes (arriba) y François Georges-Picot

El acuerdo toma su nombre de sus dos principales negociadores, Sir Mark Sykes (por Gran Bretaña) y François Georges-Picot (por Francia). Tras una serie de conversaciones que habían comenzado en noviembre de 1915, los términos del pacto fueron detallados en una carta que el embajador francés en Londres, Paul Cambon, envió al ministro de Exteriores británico, Edward Grey, el 9 de mayo de 1916. El pacto fue confirmado unos días después, el 16 de mayo, en la carta con la que Grey contestó a Cambon (reproducida a continuación). El documento final se firmó el 19 de mayo, a lo que siguió un intercambio de notas formales el día 21 de ese mismo mes.

Tras el triunfo de la Revolución Rusa, el acuerdo fue divulgado por los bolcheviques el 23 de noviembre de 1917, y publicado asimismo tres días más tarde en el diario británico The Manchester Guardian.


Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 15 May 1916:

I shall have the honour to reply fully in a further note to your Excellency’s note of the 9th instant, relative to the creation of an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be grateful if your Excellency could assure me that in those regions which, under the conditions recorded in that communication, become entirely French, or in which French interests are recognised as predominant, any existing British concessions, rights of navigation or development, and the rights and privileges of any British religious, scholastic, or medical institutions will be maintained.

His Majesty’s Government are, of course, ready to give a reciprocal assurance in regard to the British area.

Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 16 May 1916:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s note of the 9th instant, stating that the French Government accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of States, and of those parts of Syria where French interests predominate, together with certain conditions attached thereto, such as they result from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty’s Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments—

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. 3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.

4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty’s Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area (B), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

6. That in area (A) the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (B) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.

7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.

It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connexion of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French Government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis Marib-Salkhab Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching area (B).

8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversion from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two Powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States without the previous agreement of His Majesty’s Government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area.

10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.

11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.

12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two Governments.

I have further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, His Majesty’s Government are proposing to the Russian Government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your Excellency’s Government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your Excellency as soon as exchanged.

I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of the claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the Allies.

His Majesty’s Government further consider that the Japanese Government should be informed of the arrangement now concluded.

Acuerdo Sykes-Picot
Mapa firmado por Mark Sykes y François Georges-Picot el 8 de mayo de 1916, incluido en la carta enviada por Paul Cambon a Edward Grey el 9 de mayo de ese año, y que muestra el reparto de Oriente Próximo en las zonas establecidas por el acuerdo Sykes-Pikot. El mapa base original fue publicado por la Royal Geographical Society en 1910, y revisado en 1915.
Ampliar

Más documentos:

6 comentarios en «Acuerdo Sykes-Picot (1916)»

  1. Y resulta que de aquellas lluvias vienen estos lodos……tanto abuso tenía que tener (algún día) una repercusión. Desgraciadamente lo estamos viendo!!!!

Deja una respuesta

Tu dirección de correo electrónico no será publicada. Los campos obligatorios están marcados con *