El estallido contra Erdogan: un poco de análisis

gezi-park-gas-woman-in-red-turkey
Estándar
Un policía dispara gas lacrimógeno contra una ciudadana durante una protesta en la plaza Taksim, en Estambul, el pasado 28 de mayo. Foto: Osman Orsal / Reuters

Un policía dispara gas lacrimógeno contra una ciudadana durante una protesta en la plaza Taksim, en Estambul, el pasado 28 de mayo. Foto: Osman Orsal / Reuters

Empezó hace una semana con una sentada contra la destrucción de un parque en el centro de Estambul y ahora es ya, a causa, sobre todo, de la violenta respuesta policial, una protesta ciudadana masiva contra el gobierno del islamista Recep Tayyip Erdogan, sin precedentes en los once años que lleva éste en el poder.

Las manifestaciones en Turquía han continuado este domingo por tercer día consecutivo, con nuevos enfrentamientos entre manifestantes y policía en Ankara y Estambul. La policía ha vuelto a reprimir con gases lacrimógenos y cañones de agua al millar de manifestantes que intentaban acercarse a la sede del Gobierno turco, y ha intentado desalojar por la fuerza a las cerca de 10.000 personas que estaban concentradas en una céntrica plaza de la capital. En Estambul la situación parecía algo más tranquila que en los días anteriores, con miles de activistas reunidos en la céntrica plaza Taksim y el cercano parque Gezi, pero la tensión comenzó a subir de nuevo a media tarde y por la noche.

Erdogan ha reconocido que “ha habido errores” en la actuación policial y ha ordenado al Ministerio del Interior investigar los abusos (Amnistía Internacional denuncia que ha habido al menos dos muertos durante las manifestaciones). No obstante, el primer ministro rechaza las acusaciones de autoritarismo y asegura que no se doblegará ante las protestas: “No tengo nada más que decir si llaman dictador a alguien que es un servidor del pueblo”, señaló.

“Todo el mundo debería saber que Turquía es un país en el que existe un sistema parlamentario. Todo método diferente a las elecciones es antidemocrático. No quiero decir que el Ejecutivo no tenga que rendir cuentas ni que pueda hacer lo que quiera, pero, igual que una mayoría no puede presionar a una minoría, tampoco puede una minoría imponer su voluntad a una mayoría”, añadió.

Erdogan cargó asimismo contra la redes sociales, responsables en buena parte de la extensión de las protestas (#occupygezi, #occupy taksim, #direngeziparki, #genelgrevedavet): “Hay un problema que se llama Twitter. Allí se difunden mentiras absolutas”, dijo. Y también: “Esa cosa que llaman redes sociales no es más que una fuente de problemas para la sociedad actual”.

Éstas son algunas claves de lo que esta ocurriendo, recogidas en la web:

Francisco Veiga, en Eurarian Hub:

[…] The first thing that seems clear is that the Turkish government scored an own goal- i.e., a large part of the damage received has been self-inflicted by the Turkish government itself. The rigidity of Prime Minister Erdogan and police brutality magnified the importance of what happened. Television images showing the police firing generous amounts of pepper spray against demonstrators were particularly unfortunate, now that it is being discussed the use of sarin gas in Syria by forces loyal to Bashar al Assad. In addition, Erdogan’s threat of calling his supporters against the demonstrators was a poor public relations move. It was one thing to mobilize AKP followers six or seven years ago, when the Turkish Islamist government seemed under the menace of the military and the judges. But now things have changed, and to appeal to the absolute majority in parliament to justify violent actions or social rupture is an irresponsible move that is little appreciated in western democracies. […]

[…] It is still too early to glimpse what is the role being played by the major powers in this situation. But, at the moment, it seems evident that a large part of the Turkish population has not been won over by the current Turkish model that, after the rift with the European Union, presents itself as non-European. In fact, the Erdogan government has not managed to redefine a coherent alternative. Turkey is, as of today, a regional power half-way to nowhere, involved in an endless war that it cannot control, in partnership with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and heading towards confrontation with long-time, useful allies and friends. […]

[…] Erdogan might be an unsympathetic figure, but he is not a bad politician. He is getting ready to launch a media counterattack that, with the support of prestigious, intelligent party notables such as president Gül, might calm the situation down. However, if he does not take notice and rewrite his own discourse, discontentment will surface again, because “the other Turkey” is as real and tangible as the one giving electoral support to the AKP. […]

Juan Carlos Sanz, en El País:

[…] No hay primavera turca -se trata de un Estado miembro de la OTAN y candidato a la UE- ni indignación por la marcha de la economía -que sigue creciendo pese a la crisis global-, sino malestar social contra el sesgo autoritario del primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan, en el poder desde hace más de una década. […]

[…] El descontento afloró de forma espontánea ante un Gobierno que impone su mayoría hegemónica (50% de los votos en las legislativas de 2011) y da la espalda a las quejas medioambientales y culturales de los ciudadanos.

Frente a la gestión pragmática que marcó los primeros años del Gobierno del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP, en sus siglas en turco) para el acercamiento a la Unión Europea, la deriva autoritaria de una formación de conservadores religiosos que aspiraban a ser el equivalente musulmán a la democracia cristiana parece haber conducido a la Turquía de Erdogan más hacia la Rusia de Vladímir Putin que a la Alemania de Angela Merkel. […]

[…] Tras la reciente legislación que restringe la publicidad y la venta de alcohol, el estallido de la protesta ciudadana en la plaza de ha hecho emerger un movimiento inédito de rechazo al AKP, que se había beneficiado hasta ahora de la debilidad de los partidos de oposición laicos y nacionalistas.

Dorian Jones, en Eurasianet:

Having tripled the size of its economy over the past decade, Turkey is invariably held up as an economic success story. But behind this outward tale of success lies a much darker backstory, one featuring a deepening income gap and crimped workers’ rights.

In 2012, the Ministry of Family and Social Rights revealed that nearly 40 percent of Turkey’s population of over 75.6 million lives at or below the monthly minimum wage of 773 liras, or about $415.19. A further 6.4 percent live below the designated hunger line of 430 liras ($237.95).

At the same time, 63 percent of the country’s bank deposits belong to a mere one-half of a percent of all account holders, according to Turkey’s financial watchdog, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency.

Such disparity is causing concern even among government supporters. “There is [a] big social gap between rich and poor. Poverty is getting deep[er] everyday,” warned Akif Emre, an influential columnist for the pro-government newspaper Yeni Safak.

Many members of the country’s labor unions say they are reaping the consequences. “Prices are going up every day, the cost of living is becoming very expensive and workers are in no position to demand extra pay,” claimed the United Metal Workers Union’s international relations head, Eyüp Özer.

“So, what they have to do is work longer and longer hours,” Özer said. “It is not even considered overtime anymore.” […]

Íñigo Sáenz de Ugarte, en Guerra Eterna:

[…] En el fondo, laten sentimientos de furia y rechazo a un Gobierno imbatible desde hace una década en el Parlamento, habituado a contar con el 50% de los votos y con una oposición débil e incapaz de hacer mella en el partido en el poder. No es un régimen de partido único, pero la falta de alternancia y los en general buenos resultados económicos han convertido a Erdogan en un político que tiende a creer que es el líder vitalicio de Turquía.

Los jóvenes de Estambul y de otras ciudades denuncian la islamización silenciosa de la vida cotidiana. Esa oposición latente es menor en el interior del país, aunque relevante en las grandes ciudades. […]

[…] Resulta difícil de creer que esta movilización pueda poner en peligro el poder de los islamistas. Erdogan continúa siendo el político más popular y el crecimiento está asegurado en la economía. Pero con el poder casi absoluto viene con frecuencia la arrogancia, despreciar a la gente que se atreve a salir a la calle y responder a cualquier provocación con la máxima violencia permisible.

Lluís Miquel Hurtado, en El Mundo:

Tras un fin de semana con Turquía empantanada, el lunes es una prueba de evaluación de la furia ciudadana. “Es época de exámenes. Los universitarios irán corriendo a acabar los suyos en el menor tiempo posible y volverán a Taksim para proteger el parque Gezi”, aseguraba Kivanç a Elmundo.es en la madrugada del lunes. A esa hora, un grupo de manifestantes se retiraba de las barricadas: “Vamos a descansar para tomar el próximo relevo”.

Durante la noche del domingo el ‘hashtag’ #genelgrevedavet (Invitación a la Huelga General) coronaba la lista de ‘trending topics’ turcos en Twitter. En Turquía, un país en el que las huelgas generales no están permitidas, un hecho así supondría un desafío ciudadano sin precedentes en la historia. Quieran o no, con el centro de Estambul inhabilitado para el transporte, el lunes será más difícil de lo habitual llegar al trabajo.

En Ankara, la capital del país, no están las cosas más tranquilas. Las virulentas cargas del domingo, que dejaron decenas de heridos, han enfurecido a los manifestantes. Kizilay, la plaza central de la ciudad, fue campo de batalla hasta altas horas de la noche. Sus fatales consecuencias tampoco hacen presagiar que, en el tuétano de la República de Turquía, las cosas vuelvan a su cauce con la vuelta a la semana laboral. […]

Tim Arango, en The New York Times:

[…] In full public view, a long struggle over urban spaces is erupting as a broader fight over Turkish identity, where difficult issues of religion, social class and politics intersect. And while most here acknowledge that every Turkish ruling class has sought to put its stamp on Istanbul, there is a growing sense that none has done so as insistently as the current government, led by Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party, despite growing resistance. […]

[…] The swiftly changing physical landscape of Istanbul symbolizes the competing themes that undergird modern Turkey — Islam versus secularism, rural versus urban. They highlight a booming economy and a self-confidence expressed by the religiously conservative ruling elite that belies the post-empire gloom that permeates the novels of Istanbul by Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s Nobel laureate and most famous writer.

Mr. Erdogan’s decade-long rule has dramatically reshaped Turkey’s culture by establishing civilian control of the military. It has broken down rules of the old secular order that now permit the wide public expression of religion, seen in the proliferation of women wearing head scarves, by the conservative masses who make up the prime minister’s constituency. His rule has also nurtured a pious capitalist class, whose members have moved in large numbers from rural Anatolia to cities like Istanbul, deepening class divisions.

The old secular elite, who consider themselves the inheritors of the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey’s secular founder, have chafed under these transformations. So, too, have liberals, who do not label themselves Kemalists and are tolerant of public displays of religion. But they object to Mr. Erdogan’s leadership style, which they describe as dictatorial, and are put off by many of the development projects on the grounds of bad taste, a view imbued with a sense of social elitism.

For many, it has also created a sense of resentment and loss — for longtime residents, urban intellectuals and many members of the underclasses who are being pushed from their homes so that upscale housing complexes and shopping malls can be built.

And there is much more on the drawing board that evokes greater ambitions and controversies: the world’s largest airport, the country’s biggest mosque, and a proposed canal that would split Istanbul’s European side and is so audacious that even the project’s most vocal supporter, Mr. Erdogan, has called it “crazy.” Ground has already been broken on a third bridge over the Bosporus, named for a contentious Ottoman sultan who was accused of massacring Alevi Muslims, a large minority in Turkey. […]

Ariel Ben Solomon, en The Jerusalem Post:

[…] Efrat Aviv, a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and a lecturer in the department of Middle East studies at Bar-Ilan University, who closely follows the Turkish media, told The Jerusalem Post that it is difficult to find out what is going on because Turkey does not have a freedom of the press and its media are not broadcasting much about the protests. In addition, she said, one of her contacts inside the country said that on Saturday, Facebook and Twitter were shut down for a few hours.

Aviv sees the outburst as a result of a building tension that blew up because of a number of factors that have been irritating a large segment of the population, and not only secular Turks, but also some religious people and Erdogan voters.

The jailing of generals and political activists, the limitations on alcohol and smoking, the failure to act in Syria, which has created a major refugee problem in Turkey, police brutality, and upset over the peace process with the Kurds were already on the minds of much of the public when the police overreacted at the park, causing masses to turn out in protest, after what might have been a non-event if not for the police action.

However, perhaps it was just a matter of time before an event like this caused things to boil over.

“Erdogan is not Mubarak,” said Aviv, adding that she does not see this like an Arab uprising. Perhaps the protesters got some inspiration about the power of the people from the uprisings, but Turkey is a democracy, not a perfect one, but definitely on a completely different level than the Arab states, she said. […]

Gregory Gillette, en The Arabist:

[…] Turkey’s myriad of political, social, religious, ethnic and indeed athletic factions have never been so united in recent history, as evidenced by the hundreds of groups represented today. They are finding a deep sense of strength in the peace between what was formerly a series of divisions continually simmering below a thin veil of national unity. They are working together as well to ensure theirs is seen as a peaceful movement, preventing demonstrators from responding violently to police – for now. […]

Fotos de las protestas, aquí.

Responder

Introduce tus datos o haz clic en un icono para iniciar sesión:

Logo de WordPress.com

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de WordPress.com. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Imagen de Twitter

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Twitter. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Foto de Facebook

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Facebook. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Google+ photo

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Google+. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Conectando a %s